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A B S T R AC T  | This paper develops a philosophical approach to Jean and John Comarofs’ work by leshing out 
and theoretically articulating the form of critique that the Comarofs employ in their reading of the “postco-
lonial” condition. Even though Walter Benjamin’s classical correlation between law and violence provides the 
framework for the kind of critique the Comarofs perform, I want to show that when the question refers to 
what kind of critique they undertake in the context of the postcolony, as well as what form it needs to take in 
the speciic context of the postcolonial world, it is the Comarofs’ critical approaches to Michel Foucault rather 
than to Benjamin that become particularly illuminating.
K E Y WO R D S  | Author: Benjamin; Foucault; Jean and John Comarof; postcolonial critique
De una crítica de la pos-colonia a una crítica poscolonial: sobre los usos y desusos de Foucault en el trabajo 
de Jean y John Comaroff
R E S U M E N  | Este artículo propone una aproximación ilosóica al trabajo de Jean y John Comarof, a través de 
una articulación teórica de una determinada forma de crítica que dichos autores ponen en práctica en su lectura 
de la condición “poscolonial”. Si bien la correlación clásica entre ley y violencia de Walter Benjamin sería la 
referencia más evidente para una comprensión de los presupuestos ilosóicos que se encuentran a la base 
del concepto de crítica puesto en juego en el trabajo de los Comarof, el artículo propone más bien atender 
al uso crítico que los Comarof hacen de Michel Foucault. Es sobre todo en el señalamiento de los límites de la 
concepción de crítica foucaultiana que se ilumina lo que los Comarof, más allá de su crítica a la pos-colonia, 
proponen articular en términos de una crítica poscolonial.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Autor: Benjamin; crítica poscolonial; Foucault; Jean y John Comarof
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De uma crítica da pós-colônia a uma crítica pós-colonial: sobre os usos e desusos de Foucault no trabalho  
de Jean e John Comaroff
R E S U M O  | Este artigo propõe uma aproximação ilosóica ao trabalho de Jean e John Comarof, por meio de 
uma articulação teórica de uma determinada forma de crítica que esses autores colocam em prática em sua 
leitura da condição “pós-colonial”. Embora a correlação clássica entre lei e violência de Walter Benjamin tenha 
sido a referência mais evidente para a compreensão dos pressupostos ilosóicos que se encontram na base 
do conceito de crítica do trabalho dos Comarof, este artigo propõe atender ao uso crítico que os Comarof 
fazem de Michel Foucault. É principalmente na indicação dos limites da concepção de crítica foucaultiana que 
se ilumina o que os Comarof, mais além de sua crítica à pós-colônia, pretendem articular em termos de uma 
crítica pós-colonial.
PA L AV R A S - C H AV E  | Thesaurus: Benjamin; Foucault. Autor: crítica pós-colonial; Jean e John Comarof
In the introduction to their edited volume Law and Dis-
order in the Postcolony Jean and John Comarof speak 
of the dialectic between law and lawlessness that per-
vades the postcolony. This dialectic is the grammar of 
the postcolonial world, a world that is not only reduced 
to the so called “postcolonial nations,” but which could 
also be the condition of the “world at large” (“Might it 
be that […] the world at large is looking ever more ‘post-
colonial?’” [Comarof and Comarof 2006, 6]). In this 
paper, I am interested in leshing out the form of cri-
tique that the Comarofs are theoretically coniguring 
and putting into practice in their work and, in particu-
lar, their reading of the “postcolonial” condition. Even 
though Walter Benjamin’s correlation between law and 
violence is probably the most evident reference to get 
to the way the Comarofs perform their critique of the 
postcolonial world, I want to show that when it comes 
to understand what speciic form critique needs to take if 
it is not only to be of the postcolony but also a postcolo-
nial form of critique, the Comarofs’ critical approaches 
to Michel Foucault are rather more illuminating than 
their approaches to Benjamin.2
The “postcolonial” condition, the Comarofs argue (or 
I argue, following their work), conirms a structural 
relation of mutuality and co-dependency between law 
and violence, whose classical analysis brings us back to 
Benjamin’s diagnosis. Moreover, in “the postcolony,” 
the Comarofs suggest, law does not seem to need to 
hide its foundation in violence to make its sovereign-
ty and legitimacy operative, thus questioning at least 
some of the presuppositions underlying Benjamin’s 
analysis and the possibilities of interruption envisioned 
by his critique. However, the critique of a Benjaminian 
perspective is not explicitly taken up in the Comarofs’ 
work. On the contrary, Benjamin remains a constant 
reference in their analysis, even though, one would 
2 See Benjamin’s groundbreaking essay Critique of Violence 
(1996, 236-252).
have to admit, he is mentioned more often than his work 
is examined. The conceptual tools Benjamin employs in 
his critiques of both violence and history are the frame-
work that allow the Comarofs to approach the complex 
entanglements between representation and violence in 
all of its forms —of appearance and disappearance, dis-
simulation and performance— that pervade the world 
of the postcolony. Benjamin, therefore, is not the tar-
get but rather the condition of possibility of a critique 
of the postcolony in the Comarofs’ work. That is, it is 
on the basis of Benjamin’s approach to the structural 
entanglement between law and violence, and the ways 
in which this entanglement inds its speciic historical 
ways of presenting and representing itself, while also 
hiding the structural bond that makes these represen-
tations possible in the irst place, that the Comarofs 
are able to develop their critique of the postcolony and 
a corresponding postcolonial form of critique.3
3 Throughout the paper, the reader will notice that I presup-
pose instead of explaining this connection between Jean 
and John Comarof’s work and a Benjaminian notion and 
form of critique. I understand this might not be evident for 
a reader unfamiliar with their work, or with Benjamin’s, 
but anyone who has ever approached the Comarofs work 
will have noticed the constant references to the latter. In 
what follows, I will not be able to develop these connections 
explicitly, since, given the length constraints, I need to devote 
this paper entirely to the presentation and explanation of the 
Comarofs’ critique of Foucault and how this critique shows 
us another side of their double commitment; namely, a com-
mitment to critique the postcolony and to inaugurate and 
perform, accordingly, a postcolonial form of critique. During 
the workshop in Colombia with the Comarofs, and after I pre-
sented a irst version of this paper, John expressed the deep 
ainity they have always felt between their work and Ben-
jamin’s. Benjamin’s critique of violence is not only, he men-
tioned, a profoundly historical text —profoundly engrained 
in its historical and political context, and thus, thoroughly 
aware of the material as much as the conceptual conditions 
of the structures it is analyzing. Benjamin’s sensibility to the 
“sensible,” that is, to the ways in which power not only pres-
ents and represents itself but also controls its own forms of 
representation, is very telling of the sort of “historical anxi-
ety” that results from the kind of entanglement between law 
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When it comes to pointing out the limits of Western 
theoretical frameworks to analyze, explain, and criticize 
the phenomenon of violence and criminality in the post-
colony, the Comarofs turn instead to Foucault. As much 
as Foucault’s approach remains essential in understand-
ing the complex modes in which power operates in the 
postcolony, the Comarofs seem interested in bringing 
to light the limits of Foucault’s reading of modern forms 
of power as a transformation from an (earlier) spectac-
ular form of power, to invisible and all-pervasive forms 
of disciplinary power. What escapes Foucauldian analy-
sis in the context of the postcolony seems to lie precisely 
in the complex entanglement between modes of power 
that Foucault assigns to diferent, though sometimes 
simultaneous, historical temporalities. The problem 
does not lie in Foucault’s form of critique, but rather in 
the conception of history and of historical temporality 
that are presupposed by it, and that get disrupted and 
are radically challenged by the competing forms of his-
toricity coexisting and intertwining, taking shape and 
put to the test, in the time —and the forms of time— of 
the postcolony.4
In what follows, I will focus on this critique of Fou-
cault in the Comarofs’ work. More than an exegetical 
inquiry into whether this is or is not a fair criticism 
of Foucault, and whether it could be supplemented or 
complemented by other aspects of Foucault’s work, 
where one might be able to ind answers to these crit-
icisms, I am interested in understanding what these 
criticisms reveal about the Comarofs’ own analysis 
and form of critique. I intend to show that their “dis-
satisfaction” with Foucault can become a point of 
entry into the nuances and complexities of what the 
Comarofs want to analyze as the “postcolony,” while 
also giving us clues regarding the form of critique that 
would allow these nuances and complexities to come 
to light (or, better put, to present themselves in the 
various forms of their “representation”). I believe that 
these complexities, and the kind of critique that allows 
them to become visible, are ultimately closer to Ben-
jamin’s critique of violence than Foucault’s analysis of 
power. In this paper, I will develop only what the latter 
lacks, rather than expounding what the former makes 
and violence that Benjamin conveys masterfully and that one 
inds once and again pervading the postcolony (John’s words). 
Benjamin’s awareness, therefore, of the diiculty of tackling 
these kinds of phenomena directly and transparently, and 
thus, of the need to produce a convoluted approach, charac-
terized by a constellation of questions and problems rather 
than by a more traditional straightforward modality of the-
ory, is something that the Comarofs, John pointed out, have 
been very grateful for and have attempted to reproduce in 
their own work. There is, of course, much more to say about 
all these diferent connections, which is why it would take a 
separate paper to work these issues through as they deserve.
4 For a further elaboration into these “forms of temporality” 
at play in a postcolonial, or decolonial, approach to history, 
see Acosta (2018b).
possible, for the kind of critique that the Comarofs are 
performing in their work; namely, a kind of critique that 
is creatively attempting to move from a critique of the 
postcolony to the conception and practice (and the con-
ceptualization at work in this practice) of a postcolonial 
form of critique.5
***
When examining the post-apartheid transition in South 
Africa in 2006, and particularly, the role of police and 
law enforcement in connection with an apparent public 
obsession with images of crime and imaginaries of its 
(legal) resolution, the Comarofs write:
[…] the “scene-of-the-crime” in South Africa, broad-
ly conceived, is also the source of a passionate pol-
itics on the part of government, a politics aimed at 
making manifest both the shape of the nation and a 
form of institutional power capable of underwrit-
ing its ordered existence. […] the drama that is so 
integral to policing the postcolony is evidence of a 
desire to condense dispersed power in order to make 
it visible, tangible, accountable, efective. (Comarof 
and Comarof 2006, 276; author’s emphasis)
Such is the dialectic between a “metaphysics of order” 
and a “metaphysics of disorder,” in the Comarofs’ own 
words, that underlies the representation of institution-
al power in the postcolony, and the manner in which 
this power represents itself by staging itself publicly 
and visibly. If Walter Benjamin has shown us that part 
of what makes State power and its sovereignty struc-
turally violent is the arbitrariness lying at the heart of 
their implementation —in that every application of the 
law is always a decision that needs to create the criteria 
for its own determination— the Comarofs go further 
in showing how, in the case of the postcolony, power 
5 As a philosopher, I am very much interested in making explicit 
the theoretical presuppositions of the Comarofs’ work. How-
ever, I am also interested in applying this postcolonial form 
of critique to the kind of questions raised by the concrete 
challenges of our current transitional situation in Colombia 
(a transition that can be understood, as the Comarofs also 
understand in their work, not only juridically or politically, 
but also in its historical character). I believe that a postcolo-
nial form of critique can envision the possibilities lying at 
the core of the complexities of Colombian current historical 
situation, while a more classical and still too Westernized 
critical gaze, risks reducing the reality and richness of our 
“counterfeit Modernity” (to again use the Comarofs’ lan-
guage) to a failed, and, at best, yet-to-be-achieved project 
of Modernity. In a longer and much more in-depth engage-
ment with the Comarofs work, I would like to show how 
their understanding of the multiple temporalities at stake 
in the “postcolonial condition” is not only embedded in a 
very original and creative reading of Benjamin, but it also 
reveals the diferent temporalities that coincide, take place, 
and shape the “time of the transition.” I cannot develop this 
part of the argument here. For a philosophical approach to 
transitional justice, emerging from Benjamin and inspired 
by the current Colombian process, see Acosta (2018a).
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both lacks almost all capacity for efective enforcement, 
and it “knows” of this lack and compensates it by way 
of its own “theatrics.” In order to make itself “evident, 
legible and operative,” where no authority except for 
that given to it by its own “theatrics” gives legitima-
cy to institutional power, the State in the postcolony 
“strives to make actual both to its subjects and to itself,” 
through the “spectacle of policing” —and through 
policing enforced and reproduced as a spectacle— “the 
authorized face, and force, of the state-of a State, that is, 
whose legitimacy is far from unequivocal” (Comarofs 
and Comarof 2006, 276).
What we have here, the Comarofs suggest, can be 
understood as
[…] an inversion of the history laid out by Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish, according to which, famously, 
the theatricality of premodern power gives way to 
ever more implicit, internalized, capillary kinds of 
discipline. Indeed, it is precisely this telos —which 
presumes the expanding capacity of the State 
to regulate everyday existence and routinely to 
enforce punishment— that is in question in South 
Africa. (Comarofs and Comarof 2006, 276) 6
In this sense, what we are dealing with when looking 
critically at South Africa —and at the latter as an index 
of a larger phenomenon which extends today beyond 
the “postcolonies” into a globalized world7— is not only 
the question of whether there is a postcolonial form of 
power, and if so, what shape it takes. We are also, as 
the Comarofs suggest, coming to terms with the need 
6 One point regarding this quote, which becomes a main point 
of departure for my understanding of the Comarofs’ own 
conception of critique vis a vis Foucault. It is contentious to 
argue that, for Foucault, disciplinary power has to do with 
“the expanding capacity of the State to regulate everyday 
existence.” For Foucault, the State is not the exclusive, and 
perhaps not even the main institution of disciplinary pow-
er. As I will argue later in this paper, discipline for Foucault 
often takes place outside or independently of the direction or 
regulation of the State (in market economics, for example). 
I think the Comarofs not only understand this potentiality 
of Foucault’s critique, but apply it themselves in their own 
work. Perhaps this quote is then just strategic to overstate 
what they ind problematic in Foucault, or, perhaps, it is an 
oversight on their part.
7 “Postcolonies are hyperextended versions of the history of 
the contemporary world running slightly ahead of itself. 
It is the so-called margins, after all, that often experience 
tectonic shifts in the order of things irst, most visibly, most 
horriically, and most energetically, creatively, ambigu-
ously” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 41). In this sense, the 
postcolony becomes, in the Comarofs’ work, “a crucial site 
for theory construction” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 42). 
A critical work and attention to the concrete reality of the 
postcolonial nations is an entry way to a more expansive, 
broader, and historical global condition. A condition that, 
the Comarofs write, is not exclusive of the so-called post-
colonial part of the world, but that the postcolonies make 
“more readily visible” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 293).
for a “post-Foucauldian” conception of the State. They 
write: “And what might changes in the nature of police 
performance, in all senses of that term, tell us about 
the postcolonial —post-Foucauldian?— State, about its 
powers and its diferences from its precursor?” (Coma-
rof and Comarof 2006, 277).
I would like to direct my attention to diferent sides and 
implications of these claims. First, the Comarofs argue 
that the postcolony is the post-Foucauldian State, which 
means that in the postcolony (and particularly in the 
analysis of “the state-of the State” in the post colonies) 
the limits of Foucault’s analysis of power —and perhaps 
even his Eurocentrism— are evident, or come to be evi-
dent under the gaze of critique. Foucault’s insistence (at 
least in Discipline and Punish, although one could argue 
this remains to be the case also in the History of Sex-
uality and his analyses of biopolitics) on a progressive 
substitution of a pre-modern spectacular and theatrical 
form of power with an “ever more implicit, internal-
ized,” invisibly pervasive kind of discipline8 —whose 
counter-face is an operation of sovereignty reduced 
mainly to its legalistic and formalistic (also invisible) 
operation9—, turns out to be problematic, if not false, 
when looked at through the lens of institutional power 
and its manifestations in the postcolony.
In the postcolony, the Comarofs argue —and this is 
what they show concretely and through examples of 
postcolonial South Africa in many of their texts— these 
two forms of power are not only combined and over-
lapping, but they even depend on one another and have 
never ceased to co-exist. Moreover, the postcolony 
may actually show that such substitution has never 
been the logic by which these two powers relate to each 
other, and that Foucault overlooked the extent to which 
there is ultimately no “invisible” dispersion of power 
—and thus, also, as he shows later in connection to his 
analysis of sovereignty, no “juridiication” of sover-
eignty’s form of operation— without the conservation 
of the possibility of the monopoly on the spectacle of 
violence and the idea of domination that underlies its 
manifestation.10 Indeed, as the Comarofs point out very 
8 Particularly Foucault’s analysis of “The spectacle of the 
scafold” in Discipline and Punish (Foucault 1995, 32-69).
9 For this side of the analysis see: Foucault (2003, 34– 39).
10 As I clariied earlier, I am not interested, in this paper, in 
confronting the Comarof’s criticism of Foucault and their 
suggestion for the need for a post-Foucauldian analysis of 
power in the postcolony with Foucault’s own work and the 
complexities and developments of his arguments during 
those years in the mid 70’s in his work, from Discipline and 
Punish and his Lectures at the College de France, to the History 
of Sexuality. I understand also that the contrast between the 
(pre-modern) spectacle and visibility of the enforcement 
of power and disciplinary power becomes more compli-
cated with Foucault’s distinction between disciplinary power 
and sovereignty (Foucault 2013, 34– 39). What I want to attend 
to for now and for the purposes of this paper is to the fact 
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clearly in their analysis, “politics-as-theater” has never 
truly been separated from “biopolitics.” The argument 
for this separation, they continue, is itself
[…] the product of a modernist ideology that would 
separate symbolic from instrumental coercion, 
melodrama from a politics of rationalization. […] 
Theater has never been absent from the counter-
point of ritual and routine, visibility and invisibility. 
It has always been integral to the staging of power 
and of law and order in authoritative, communica-
ble form. (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 293)
Thus, and this is the second point I want to raise here 
in connection to the Comarofs’ previous remarks, the 
State as spectacle —as making a spectacle of itself and 
its power— should not be read (as it could be the case 
in Foucault) as a recalcitrant remnant of an antiquated 
form of power.11 As Banu Bargu has recently point-
ed out, also as a criticism of Foucault, and also with a 
postcolonial gaze in mind, the visible manifestation of 
power and its theatricality have always already been 
the condition of possibility —rather than what needs to 
be left behind or “substituted”— for the juridiication of 
the State and the dispersion of power within society. 
Bargu proposes to go back to Hobbes and ind in his 
original conceptualization of modern forms of sover-
eignty what Foucault would have missed in his reading 
of Hobbes in his Lectures at the College de France. Thus, 
Bargu concludes, in a very Benjaminian manner:
Hobbes shows that sovereignty is not the absence 
of violence or domination but the ability to assert 
their erasability as the ultimate proof of power 
[…] Hobbes [vis a vis Foucault’s interpretation] does 
not bifurcate domination from sovereignty; to the 
contrary, it is proof that he equates sovereignty 
and domination precisely by erasing their difer-
ence. This elision allows Hobbes to conceal the 
bifurcation within sovereignty […] Sovereign power 
is not the equivalent of law just because it assumes 
and appropriates the language of law; rather, it 
appropriates that language insofar as it is powerful 
enough to render invisible, if not irrelevant, the 
constantly threatening reality of conlict through 
a legally sanctioned eradication of that conlict. 
[…] Hence, the profound conclusion that Foucault 
omits, in my opinion, is that the discourse of sov-
ereignty involves the performative erasure of its 
own foundations, precisely in light of its accurate 
that, borrowing Banu Bargu’s way of stating this criticism, 
Foucault was perhaps “too hasty to relegate sovereignty 
(as the other, dark side, of disciplinary power) to a shadow 
play, even as he revolutionized the way we analyze power” 
(Bargu 2014, 49). And that this comes particularly to the fore 
in a critical analysis of the postcolony, as it is the case with 
the Comarofs’ work.
11 See here again Bargu (2014, 50f).
recognition of those foundations. (Bargu 2014, 62; 
author’s emphasis)
Although this is not the place to develop what I think 
would be a very fruitful comparison between Bargu’s 
work and the Comarofs’, the coincidences between 
their criticisms of Foucault illustrate something fun-
damental about the postcolonial gaze and the kind of 
critique that is required by a postcolonial analysis of 
sovereignty and power. For both, going beyond Fou-
cault allows them to understand the speciic ways in 
which the theatricality of power, particularly evident 
in the postcolony, is not disconnected from, but rath-
er guarantees the capacity of that very same power to 
erase its traces and exercise its dominion, not only in 
imperceptible and invisible ways, as Foucault’s analysis 
of disciplinary power suggests, but also —closer to Ben-
jamin— in its capacity for invisibilizing and erasing its 
own traces, and, even further, in making a spectacle of 
this invisibility. And, as the Comarofs argue, in under-
standing that this spectacle is, simultaneously, what 
compensates for the lack of legitimation at the core of 
this form of dominion.
Bargu’s critique of Foucault is connected speciically 
to the political phenomenon of forced disappearance. 
Bargu wants to show that a postcolonial analysis of 
sovereignty aims at showing how phenomena like dis-
appearance —and everything that happens to the body 
but also to its memory in order to guarantee the erasure 
of all traces— are not simply accidental or contingent 
but rather constitutive of the modes of operation of 
modern sovereignty, and thus, central to the possibil-
ity of sovereignty for exercising its power. Following 
this objective, Bargu argues for a revision of Foucault in 
the light of Hobbes’ conception of sovereignty (Bargu 
2014, 51f). The constitutive act of modern sovereignty 
for Hobbes, as well as its power, remain entangled with 
that of erasability, meaning both the violent erasure 
of the arbitrariness of the distinction between who 
gets to live and who gets to die, but also, the erasure of 
the violence itself, and precisely because it is recognized 
as necessary for the sustainability of power.
In this sense, Bargu, like the Comarofs, proposes a 
revision of Foucault’s diagnosis of modern sovereignty 
and governability, no longer as the dark remnants of an 
antiquated form of power (Bargu 2014, 49), but rather 
as simultaneous with and dependent on the power of 
terror and the spectacle of its violence. Only that, in 
the case of Bargu speciically, the spectacle is no longer 
visible but is rather spectacular in its invisibility: its 
threat is overwhelming, but its traces and its actions 
are erased, and this is the clearest manifestation of its 
power. Mbembe and his analysis of necropolitics (2003) 
becomes a key reference in this context, as it is for the 
Comarofs. Hence, Bargu proposes, as I think the Coma-
rofs do too, that “we need a more complex understand-
ing of sovereignty than that available in Foucault’s 
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thought. As a modest step toward this goal, we must 
question the purely juridical conception of sovereign-
ty that tends to diminish its actual complexity” (Bargu 
2014, 50-51).12
I would insist, however, that for the Comarofs, one 
needs to add yet another layer to all of this —one per-
haps present but not suiciently stressed in Bargu and 
Mbembe. Namely, that the postcolonial (post-Fou-
cauldian) State does not only ind one of its constitutive 
gestures in spectacularizing its power for erasure and 
invisibility, but also, and even more so, according to 
the Comarofs, in the fact that this very same power 
remains tied to its capacity to represent itself as pow-
erful. In any case, as in Bargu’s analysis, the entangle-
ment between the theatrical and disciplinary forms 
of power in the postcolony, or more concretely, in 
postcolonial nations (as in the case of South Africa, but 
also, clearly, in places like Colombia as well), cannot be 
reduced to an early stage in a process that ultimately 
tends towards the substitution of the disciplinary for 
the theatrical forms of power. It is this telos that the 
postcolony puts radically into question, the Comarofs 
write. Postcolonies, they insist, may be countries in 
transition —and this transitional situation may become 
in itself a privileged site for critique— but this does not 
mean that they represent a transitional state of afairs:
[we are] not speaking of a period of transition, a pass-
ing moment in the life and times of the postcolony, 
a moment suspended uneasily somewhere between 
the past and the future. This is the ongoing present. 
It is history-in-the-making. (Comarof and Comarof 
2006, 41; author’s emphasis)13
If what the Comarofs are suggesting is a post-Foucauldian 
State, and with it, the need for a critique that goes beyond 
Foucault’s analysis, this means that what is needed is 
not only a “correction” of Foucault’s outlook, but rather 
a whole displacement of the frameworks of analysis. 
Namely, an account, a gaze and a mode of critique able 
to understand the apparent inversion —or what looks 
like an “inversion” from Foucault’s perspective— of the 
12 Once again, as mentioned earlier, I am not looking into 
whether these authors, be it the Comarofs or Bargu, are 
making a fair criticism of Foucault. Foucault very explicitly 
rejects a purely juridical conception of sovereignty in His-
tory of Sexuality I. However, it is not a coincidence that Bar-
gu, like the Comarofs, underlies the problematic juridical 
character of Foucault’s conception of sovereignty. It might 
be that, independently of Foucault’s lucid clariications here 
and there, his analysis is still framed in a juridical paradigm 
of sovereignty that is not entirely overcome or compensat-
ed by his awareness of the limits of this paradigm for the 
historical analysis.
13 See in this regard also my commentary to Christoph Men-
ke’s work on Benjamin’s critique of law and law’s capacity 
for self-criticism, where I also argue that transitional con-
texts are privileged sites for critique à la Benjamin (Acosta 
2018a, 79-95).
relationships between the visible theatricality of power 
and its invisible imperceptible spheres of action, through 
a more complicated account of their mutual dependence.
***
Let’s recapitulate for a moment before we go further 
into what I would like to show is a particularly postco-
lonial form of critique at play in the Comarofs’ work 
—that is, not only a critique that illuminates the post-
colony and the complexity of its structures, but also 
one that develops, in the process, its own frameworks 
of analysis; one, thus, that is not only concerned with 
making visible what has been hidden, but also with sub-
verting and interrupting the logics that have made this 
invisibility possible in the irst place. For the Comarofs, 
the original opposition between visibility and invisi-
bility that describes power and violence in Foucault’s 
analysis, whether it is power as sovereignty or the 
ghostly pervasiveness of disciplinary power in society, 
becomes a complicated operation whereby what mat-
ters is not only the mechanisms of power —that is, the 
ways in which power operates (invisibly or visibly) in 
order to guarantee its eicacy, legitimate its authority, 
and produce the subjects needed to maintain itself— 
but also, and perhaps even more so, the ways in which 
power produces its own representations, its own images 
of itself as powerful and efective, particularly in lim-
it-cases where such a power is either contested, put to 
the test, or simply proven to be entirely impotent.
The visibility, in these contexts, is the spectacle that com-
pensates for the State’s lack of power, rather than being 
the one displaying this power in all its might. In such 
contexts —for example, in the case of postcolonial 
forms of sovereignty— the State is often less inter-
ested in sustaining the invisibility of the structural 
violence that supports it and that is presupposed by 
its claim to legitimacy. It is more concerned with mak-
ing visible its capacity for hiding and keeping invisible 
those structures and the arbitrariness of their foun-
dation. State power is therefore to be measured, fol-
lowing Bargu, in its capacity to play with its faculty to 
visibilize its power of “invisibilization,” and, in turn, 
with the invisibility of its constant efort to produce 
and make visible, “to render perceptible to the public 
eye” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 280), the repre-
sentations and the images of its power.
A complicated dialectics between visibility and invis-
ibility is at play here. This dialectic is closer, I would 
argue, to Benjamin’s critique of violence than it is to 
Foucault’s analysis, insofar as Benjamin’s critique is con-
cerned with the ways in which violence produces and 
controls its own (forms of) representation.14 A critique 
14 Such an interpretation of Benjamin only comes to light 
if one reads his early essay on a Critique of Violence in 
tandem with his late essay on The Work of Art in the Age 
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of violence, for Benjamin, requires special attention to 
the structure of law and law-enforcement. One could 
argue that Foucault’s main point is precisely to take us 
away from this narrow perspective (a perspective that 
is indeed, Foucault argues, “characteristic of our societ-
ies,” but must also be conceived as transitory [Foucault 
1990, 89]), and to insist on the need to move beyond an 
exclusive attention to power in the (visible) spheres of 
the State and legality, towards its more inconspicuous 
sites where power inds, in modernity, its own oper-
ativity and techniques of production. Let me quote 
extensively here:
[…] if it is true that the juridical system was useful 
for representing, albeit in a non-exhaustive way, a 
power that was centered primarily around destruc-
tion and death, it is utterly incongruous with the 
new methods of power whose operation is not 
ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by 
normalization, not by punishment but by control, 
methods that are employed on all levels and in 
forms that go beyond the State and its apparatus. 
[…] One remains attached to a certain image of pow-
er-law, of power-sovereignty […] it is this image 
that we must break free of, that is, of the theoret-
ical privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to 
analyze power within the concrete and historical 
framework of its operation. We must construct 
an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a 
model and a code. (Foucault 1990, 89-90)
This is however connected precisely to the apparent 
inversion the Comarofs mention in their critique of 
Foucault, which helps to specify the focus and frame-
work of their analysis. It is not so much that, in analyzing 
the postcolony, we are going back to a narrow attention 
to the ways in which power operates in relation to the 
law. It is, rather, that in an already post-Foucauldian cri-
tique —one that takes into account the need to expand 
the critical gaze towards all the sites and the platforms 
in which power reproduces itself in contemporary 
societies— any approach to the postcolony needs to 
deal with at least two fundamental sides or elements 
of this critical operation, two sides that complicate the 
framework of Foucault’s claim.
On the one hand, in the postcolony, law and the author-
ity of the State continue representing themselves as 
central to the operation of power. Thus, the State is 
not only the quiet bureaucratic apparatus that is slow-
ly formalized and reduced to juridiication, interested 
in its own nulliication and imperceptible, dispersed 
presence. Law-enforcement becomes, in the postco-
lony, as the Comarofs suggest, the “privileged site 
for staging eforts […] to summon the active presence 
of Mechanical Reproduction (see Benjamin 1996 and 2002 
respectively). I must thank Alejandra Azuero for such an 
insightful suggestion.
of the state into being” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 
280; author’s emphasis) in contexts where what reigns, 
otherwise, is not quiet normalization but a constant 
state of exception. To go even further, the postcolo-
ny is the regime of “the State-as-violence” (Comarof 
and Comarof 2006, 286), not only because it performs 
itself as violence, but also because it is obsessed with 
producing the iction of its own violent performance, 
paradoxically as a way to guarantee what it nonethe-
less legitimately fails to enforce.15
On the other hand, what the Comarofs want to stress 
is not a legal and juridical framework for a critique of 
power, but the role and the place that the fascination 
for the law (the “fetishism of the law” (Comarof 2005, 
133)) and its imagery, namely, the production of the 
iction of a metaphysics of order as a response to an 
equally produced and projected metaphysics of disor-
der, play in the ways in which power actually operates.16 
This fascination is a symptom, but, as such, is all too 
real and all too easily instrumentalized by contempo-
rary (capitalist, neo-liberal, etcetera) forms of power.17 
Similarly, the Comarofs’ most recent research com-
plements this fascination with the law with an equally 
pervasive (maybe also because it is just the other side 
of the former) fascination with crime and its represen-
tation. Images of crime, same as images of law and its 
15 In this sense, as I mentioned earlier, I think the analysis of 
the Comarofs goes beyond analyses like the one by Bar-
gu referenced above, insofar as they are not only paying 
attention to the performance of the State (and the ways in 
which the State performs, as in Bargu’s criticism, its own 
invisibility as the very visible spectacle of its pervasive 
threat), but also to the performance by the State of its own 
performativity; that is, the self-representation of the State. 
I cannot develop this side of the argument here. In order to 
do so, one would have to go slowly through the examples 
the Comarofs are analyzing in their chapter on “Criminal 
Obsessions,” particularly that of the Police Museum and the 
question of the literal and not only igurative “staging” of 
the State as law-enforcer.
16 The Comarofs deine both as follows: “Metaphysics of dis-
order —the hyperreal conviction that society hovers on the 
brink of dissolution” (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 295), 
and “metaphysics of order, [the idea] of the nation as a moral 
community guaranteed by the State” (Comarof and Coma-
rof 2006, 279). They are both interdependent illusions, sup-
porting each other and given content by the representations 
of criminality and their resolution by State power.
17 Jean Comarof analyses this side of the argument in detail in 
“The End of History, Again?” pointing to the consequences 
this fetishism of the law has for the conceptualization and 
elaboration of history and memory in the postcolony. I ind 
her analysis in this respect particularly relevant for our cur-
rent situation in Colombia, and her critique of the dangers of 
a privatization and neoliberalization of history a very sharp 
way of pointing to the possible risks we need to contend, 
make visible, and deal with in our current “fascination” both 
with legalism and politics of memory in Colombian transi-
tional context. For an analysis of this side of the fascination 
of the law in connection precisely to a Colombian juridical 
perspective, see Esteban Restrepo’s work, particularly 
Restrepo (2014).
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enforcement, both provide for the Comarofs a gram-
mar. That is, they provide a ield of sense that renders 
visible and audible the State of the nation (Comarof and 
Comarof 2006, 275) and the desire behind its structures 
and failures. They create a framework for representation 
and signiication, therefore, in places where the radical 
transformation characteristic of regimes in transition 
has simultaneously deprived older referents of their 
meanings and is demanding new ones instead. In this 
respect, the Comarofs write:
[…] but fantasy is never reducible to pure function-
ality. Crime iction also provides regularly avail-
able tropes for addressing ironies, for ventilating 
desires, and, above all, for conjuring a moral com-
monwealth, especially when radical transformation 
unseats existing norms and robs political language 
of its meaning. (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 278)
Beyond what more traditional analyses of power identi-
fy as the materiality of violence, there remains also the 
meanings that violence itself introduces and recreates. 
Or, perhaps, stating it more precisely, an attention to the 
forms in which violence seeks to communicate itself —
an attention, therefore, to what the Comarofs describe 
as the “poetic techniques” of violence— demands the 
production of speciic regimes of signiication that can 
respond to the economies of meaning imposed and 
introduced by the very singular form in which violence 
represents itself in the postcolony.18 “It is di cult, the 
Comarofs write, to capture the realities of policing 
the postcolony without rethinking the regime of represen-
tation required by the present moment” (Comarof and 
Comarof 2006, 285). A critique of the postcolony needs 
to formulate its own “signifying economy” (Comarof 
and Comarof 2006, 284), namely, a grammar capable of 
confronting, without reducing, a kind of violence that 
is already enacted as if it were a iction, where “the line 
between fact and fantasy, order and chaos, safety and 
violence” is constantly dissolving and in the process of 
being contested (Comarof and Comarof 2006, 285).
In other words, what the Comarofs’ analysis asks is 
what these fascinations, and the corresponding staging 
eforts on the part of the State, tell us about the post-
colony, about the way in which the postcolonial State 
18 The attention to the need for new regimes of signiication 
that will allow to make audible —and not only visible— the 
multiple forms in which violence has, on the one hand, 
destroyed, and, on the other, shaped and instituted meaning, 
is one very much connected, I would say, to what Hannah 
Arendt describes as the “horriic originality” of totalitar-
ian forms of violence. I have worked extensively on this 
question, and on the claim it exposes for “new grammars 
of listening,” in some of my current work on philosophical 
approaches to memory and violence after trauma. For a 
couple of recent developments of this question, see Acosta 
(2017; 2018c; 2019), and for a more in-depth analysis of this 
idea, my forthcoming book on Grammars of Listening.
operates. Their analysis also asks why power in the 
postcolony cannot be disentangled from this fascina-
tion, and from the capacity of State power to represent 
itself; that is, to produce representations of itself and of 
the narratives of order that it promises and cannot ful-
ill —or better, and perhaps more accurately, that it in 
fact attempts to fulill precisely (and only) by producing 
these narratives.
Not to ignore these narratives, not to reduce them to 
mere remnants of an antiquated form of power, or to a 
ictional product of an insuiciently modern State, but to 
take them at their “truth”; namely, at the reality to which 
they give form and about which they speak —this is the 
challenge of a critique of the postcolonial world. Meet-
ing this challenge requires, as we have seen, not only a 
critical gaze on our usual constructions of a critique of 
power, which will show, in a diferent light, the global, 
historical present of the postcolony, but also, and per-
haps even more urgently, a postcolonial form of critique, 
that is, a form of critique that learns how to speak and to 
listen to the particular grammars enacted in the postco-
lony, before even attempting to address the structures 
that are shaped by its own mechanisms and techniques.
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